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1 Introduction
The 2007-2009 financial crisis has highlighted the critical role of the interbank interconnected-
ness for the stability of the global financial system. It also showed the importance of having
access to viable short-term funding in periods of crisis, being that liquidity problems can
rapidly spillover to other interconnected banks and lead to default propagation. Crucially, any
default propagation, if not controlled, might then lead to systemic risks and deep economic
problems.1 Interestingly, although the critical role of banks’ liquidity has been studied prior to
the financial crisis (see, among many others, e.g.: Freixas et al. (2000)), we know comparatively
little about the causal implications of liquidity on banks default behaviours, and the precise
mechanisms through which interbank default propagation operates in the financial system. In
this regard, Andy Haldane, the Chief Economist of the Bank of England, has noted that “..to
safeguard against systemic risk, the financial system needs to be managed as a system” (Hal-
dane (2009)). In another speech, Haldane has stressed how today’s financial system is heavily
interconnected and raised the question on “...what might be done to close this fault-line, to
improve the resilience of the international monetary system?” (Haldane (2014)). He also ques-
tioned the usefulness in the current financial system’s architecture of contingent convertible
bonds (CoCos),2 an hybrid financial instrument introduced by regulators after the financial
crisis with the aim of enhancing financial stability.
Designed to reduce the impact of a lack of short-term liquidity in times of financial distress,
CoCos have been extensively issued by financial institutions in the aftermath of the 2008-2009
financial crisis, with the aim of providing a buffer in bad times. CoCos are essentially coupon-
paying bonds that convert into equity shares, or are fully or partially written-off, when the
issuer reaches a pre-specified level of financial distress. Hence, CoCos are regulatory instru-
1Started with the collapse of the US real estate market and the sub-prime mortgage market, the crisis severely
impacted the interbank US debt market. Due to a reduced investors’ appetite for risk, overnight bank funding
rates dramatically spiked to unprecedented levels, and the interbank lending market collapsed. Consequently,
troubled banks found impossible to refinance their short-term debt liabilities, paving the way to a dramatic credit
crunch. Credit crunch that caused several epic banks failures, such as Bearn Stearns and Lehman Brothers
defaults, subsequently spilled over to the real economy. Additionally, several other systemically important
financial institutions (SIFIs) had to rely on governments’ support to prevent bankruptcies, at the expense of
taxpayers.
2Throughout this paper we refer to CoCo and CoCos for single and multiple contingent convertible bonds,
respectively.
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ments designed to absorb the issuing banks unexpected future losses by means of an automatic
recapitalization triggered at a pre-defined level, hence providing monetary additional loss ab-
sorbing capital to under-capitalized banks, in periods when would be otherwise difficult to raise
fresh equity capital. The level of financial distress is associated with the quality of the bank’s
capital, and is determined by accounting values (book-value trigger), by a pre-determined
price-level of the issuer’s stock (market-value trigger), or by a pre-settled discretionary rule
(regulatory trigger). CoCos have been so far untested in the marketplace (especially during pe-
riods of uncertainty and high volatility) despite some notable episodes of market turmoil since
the financial crisis of 2008-2009. The most prominent example in recent practice is Deutsche
Bank that in October 2016 experienced severe problems with its CoCos, which dropped to
around 75 cents on the euro, and many other problems, including uncertainty around the
power of regulators to impose losses, played a part. Moreover, investors started to believe
that Deutsche Bank might default on some of its debt obligations on its CoCos, and sparked a
broader sell off in European banks stocks. Evidence suggests that this decline may have deter-
mined a default propagation effect, with other major European banks experiencing a similar
decline in the value of their CoCos at the same time.
In this paper, we design a balance sheet-based network to study the contagion or stability
effects of CoCos within an interbank financial network. From the broadest perspective, we
study whether the introduction of CoCos can effectively reduce the overall amount of systemic
risk in the economy. In our setting, we model the financial system (the economy) as a net-
work of interconnected financial intermediaries, specifically banks. More precisely, given this
economy, we examine the role of CoCos and their ability to possibly mitigate the extent of
default propagation that may result in systemic failures among other financial intermediaries.
A crucial question we ask in this study is whether, also in presence of CoCos, interconnected
systems tend to be simultaneously both stable and unstable, calm and turbulent, robust-yet-
fragile (Haldane (2014), Acemoglu et al. (2015) and Gai and Kapadia (2010)). To do it, we
examine the default propagation of the system in presence of shocks, the level of financial
distress and the role of the CoCos equity conversion in the interbank system. The first two
elements capture the mechanism of contagion propagation, by proxying the “widening” of the
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shock, while the equity conversion of CoCos exemplifies the “deepening” of the shock during
a financial crisis (further details in Section 2).
To examine whether and how CoCos enhance the stability of the banking sector we extend Ace-
moglu et al. (2015) by introducing CoCos in the financial network. Specifically, to identify
which type of network may have a role in increasing or decreasing the financial stability, we
propose three different financial networks: one with a low degree of interconnections (ring net-
work), one with a high degree of interconnections (complete network) and different networks
with an intermediate and always increasing degree of interconnections. A ring network is a
network topology in which each bank (node) connects to exactly two other (banks) nodes,
forming a single continuous pathway for signals through each node - effectively a ring. Data
travels from node to node, with each node along the way handling every packet. The complete
network is instead a network topology where all banks (nodes) are fully interconnected. All
intermediate networks are between the ring and the complete networks. Having defined the
type of interbank network, we then study how this network reacts to negative shocks in the
economy and the mechanism for the propagation of shocks. More precisely, we hit the financial
network simulating negative shocks of different magnitude to test the level of stability of the
financial network, and whether/how contagion propagates among interconnected banks.
To shed light on the role of CoCos as financial stability instruments, we first propose the
network structure without CoCos and study the stability of the network, along with other
properties (Section 3). Next, we introduce CoCos in the banks’ balance sheets, and analyze
their effects within the financial network. Moreover, to better analyze the width and depth
of the shocks in the network, we introduce CoCos in our model in two stages (Section 4).
In a first step, we restrict our attention to CoCos while abstracting away from the effects
of the equity conversion in the connected financial network (Section 4.2). In a second step,
we assume that all the banks in the financial network can effectively use the CoCos proceeds
(Section 4.2). To establish whether the specific design characterization of CoCos matter in
an interbank network, we thus analyze the financial network’s responses in presence of CoCos
equity conversions. This double steps procedure is designed to provide a more comprehensive
analysis of the role of CoCos in the propagation of shocks.
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Three main results emerge from our study. First, the phase transition and the robust-yet-
fragile result documented by Acemoglu et al. (2015) in absence of CoCos is confirmed also
in presence of CoCos. Second, we show that for the most realistic networks (the ones with
an intermediate degree of interconnection) lightly interconnected networks are more robust to
moderate shocks than highly interconnected ones. Notably, this result goes against the con-
ventional wisdom that a more interconnected interbank structure enhances the stability of the
financial system (Allen and Gale (2000), Freixas et al. (2000)). Finally, we document that Co-
Cos are beneficial for the economy, but the type of network is of critical importance for CoCos
issuers and investors and for the effectiveness of CoCos as a financial stability enhancing mech-
anism. More in details, we not only show the importance of the network for Cocos, but also
that the introduction of CoCos in the interbank network can ultimately produce destabilizing
effects due to potential adverse selection problems within banks. In the presence of moderate
shocks, fully and highly interconnected networks may in fact function as sources of unneeded
triggers (a trigger that is only consequence of a highly interconnected network, and not of a
bank default), resulting in suboptimal conversions, thus damaging CoCos investors that will
no longer receive the coupon payment. On the other hand, lightly interconnected networks
may be optimal for both issuers and investors. Furthermore, for large negative shocks, the
stability of the financial network with CoCos is stronger than without CoCos (vanilla case).
A better understanding of these linkages is of crucial importance for the academic community,
market participants and policymakers.
It is important to note that, given their nature, the configuration of CoCos is not straight-
forward and, to date, both academics and practitioners still disagree on how CoCos should be
structured and priced. Despite being complex products, CoCos can be fully determined by
three main elements: the trigger, the conversion ratio and how they are held before conver-
sion. As summarized by Flannery (2014) and Greene (2016), various configurations of these
three elements may lead to very different outcomes and effects, both for the issuers and the
investors. While we recognize that the design features of CoCos is surely a theme of relevance
to the academic and policy debate, in this paper we take an“agnostic” perspective and take
the configuration as given and guided by purely practical reasons. Concretely, in this paper,
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we focus on CoCos with a single book-value trigger, with equity conversion provision, which
represents a considerable fraction of all CoCos issued to date. Needless to say, the same net-
work analysis could be applied to other CoCos configuration, but would require some changes
in the way conversion is triggered and executed.3
1.1 Institutional Background and Related Literature
Firstly introduced by Lloyds in November 2009, CoCos have been promoted by different reg-
ulators as a bail-in mechanism to promote banking stability and to reduce the fiscal burdens
for taxpayers. Through the October 2011 reformed Capital Adequacy Rules (Basel Committee
on Banking Supervision (2010)) and the November 2009 Capital Requirements Directive II
(CRDII) the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision and the European Commission recog-
nized CoCos as Tier 1 bank capital, thus making CoCos even more captivating for banks, as
evidenced by the 2011-2015 boom in CoCos issuances.4 Using as an accounting-based trigger
event like the bank’s Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1), it is possible to differentiate between
high and low trigger CoCos. High-trigger CoCos have a CET1-trigger level above 5.125% and,
due to their capacity of reducing bank’s leverage, receive an equity-like treatment by regula-
tors. Notably, the assimilation of CoCos to debt from a fiscal viewpoint, and to regulatory
capital (equity) by financial regulators, have paved the way to the emergence (and subsequent
rapid growth) of a sizeable and active market for CoCos in both Europe and Asia. Low-trigger
CoCos are instead normally considered as Tier 2 capital, and may lead to the orderly resolu-
tion of failed banks. Departing from this distinction Goncharenko et al. (2017) documents the
connection between the issuer’s characteristics and the CoCos design.
As documented by Avdjiev et al. (2020), since the Lloyd’s first issuance, more than 500 billion
US dollars of CoCos have been issued, with more than 400 issues by different banks in different
countries.5 Interestingly, while for fiscal reasons in the US banks use other types of instruments
3For ease of space and clarity, in this paper we only focus on CoCos with single book-value trigger and equity
conversion, and we leave the analysis of other types of CoCos as a future research.
4According to Moody’s Investors Service (2015), the period 2011-2015 has seen an issuance of approximately
more than $300 billion CoCos with a boom for the year 2014 with an emission of $93 and $82 billion of Tier I
and Tier II CoCos due in large part to regulatory changes that made CoCos fiscally attractive.
5While the majority of issuances have been in Europe (inclusive of the UK and Switzerland), other countries
like China (inclusive of Hong Kong), Australia, Japan, and Canada have also issued a substantial amount of
CoCos.
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to boost their Tier 1 capital (e.g.: preferred stocks),6 US investors are net buyers of CoCos,
possibly attracted by the higher yields they offer within a low-interest-rate environment. In
a document for the Chairman of the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Financial
Services, Greene (2016) discusses the conditions under which the introduction of CoCos in the
US capital markets may augment overall social welfare.
Our paper contributes to the broader literature on systemic risk. To the best of our knowledge,
this is the first paper, with Gupta et al. (2020), that analyzes the role of CoCos in an interbank
network. However, we depart from the framework in Gupta et al. (2020) and we propose a
totally different network structure to describe our economy. While the very first idea of a
CoCos-like product has been initially proposed by Merton (1991), the literature on CoCos be-
gins with Flannery (2002) and Flannery (2005) which propose to use CoCos as a capitalization
buffer in bad states of the economy and is surveyed in Flannery (2014). Kashyap et al. (2008)
and the The Squam Lake Report (2010)7 discuss the role of CoCos in bank capital regula-
tion. A recent strand of the literature discusses how the possible configurations of CoCos can
lead to corporate governance problems like debt overhang, or to risk shifting/taking incentives
and possible bank failures due to extreme deleveraging (Koziol and Lawrenz (2012), Hilscher
and Raviv (2014), Berg and Kaserer (2011), Chan and Wijnbergen (2017), Goncharenko et al.
(2017), Martynova and Perotti (2018), Albul et al. (2013), Chen et al. (2017) and Goncharenko
(2019). Notice that the effective modeling and design of CoCos is still a fundamental open and
unresolved research question in the academic literature. Calomiris and Herring (2013), Bolton
and Samama (2012), McDonald (2013), and Pennacchi et al. (2014) develop models where Co-
Cos have trigger linked to accounting values. Sundaresan and Wang (2015), Glasserman and
Nouri (2016), Pennacchi and Tchistyi (2018), and Pennacchi and Tchistyi (2019) also analyze
the CoCos configuration, but from a market value perspective. The incentive effects of CoCos
in individual banks have been investigated by, among others, Hori and Cero´n (2017).
Our paper also adds in some respects to the financial network literature. While Allen and Gale
(2000) and Freixas et al. (2000) are the first theoretical papers that analyze the stability of
6In the US, notably due to different accounting and tax rules, there is no marketability of CoCos. The interested
reader is referred to a 2012 Report published by the Financial Stability Oversight Council.
7As defined in their website, “The Squam Lake Group” is a non-partisan, non-affiliated group of academics who
offer guidance on the reform of financial regulation”. The group, made up of US academics, has been created
during the 2007-2008 financial crisis, and focuses on long-term financial issues.
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interconnected financial institutions through the lens of the network analysis, it is only after
the 2007-2008 financial crisis that researchers started looking at the financial system through
the lens of a network (e.g.: among many others: Gai and Kapadia (2010), Acemoglu et al.
(2015), Acemoglu et al. (2016), Brunetti et al. (2019), Avdjiev et al. (2020)) Most of these
studies explore the different designs of CoCos as well as plain vanilla financial networks, i.e.:
without hybrid products like CoCos. By contrast, in this paper we focus on how CoCos interact
in a financial network, thus proposing a more sophisticated (and possibly more realistic) set-
ting of financial networks. From a policy perspective, the findings of this paper are potentially
important in helping regulators better understand the role of CoCos for the stability of the
financial system, and might have important implications for the optimal design and regulation
of the financial system. Our results could help to better understand how policymakers might
address the use of CoCos to effectively reduce the level of systemic risk in the financial system
and enhance market liquidity at times of crisis.
1.2 Outline of the Paper
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the interbank network
and the repayment system of the model. Section 3 describes, still without the presence of
CoCos, the ring, the complete and the intermediate financial networks. Section 4, introduces
CoCos in the different networks and examines their financial stability effects. To better elu-
cidate the role of the repayment rule in the network, we discuss the main differences between
CoCos with and without equity conversion in Sections 4.1 and 4.2, respectively. Section 5
concludes. All proofs and supplemental formal results are provided in the Appendix.
2 The interbank model
In its most simplified set-up (i.e. cash ci = 0) a stylized bank i’s balance sheet looks like in
Figure 1 where xij represents what bank j returns to bank i, s represents the bank senior
obligations (e.g.: taxes, wages, money market funds) and zi is the remaining fraction of the
balance sheet not explained by the previous elements (e.g.: bank i’s investments). Given this
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Figure 1: Bank i’s balance sheet as defined in Equation (1).
framework, the bank i’s balance sheet identity is:
∑
j 6=i
xij + zi =
∑
j 6=i
xji + s (1)
It follows that
∑
j 6=i xji = xi 6 yi, where yi is the face value of the inter-bank liability. Thus,
when xi < yi then bank i defaults on its junior obligations.
The presence of CoCos on the balance sheet of a bank and, more in general, any type
of debt securities, creates bilateral obligations among the issuer and the owner. To analyze
how these obligations affect the issuer and the owner we set up an interbank network. Banks
obligations are represented as a weighted and directed graph on n nodes. Each bank in the
network is represented by a node. The obligations are then represented by directed edges
among nodes. Specifically, a directed edge from node i to node j exists if bank i is creditor
of bank j, such that yij represents the face value of the contract among the two banks. The
interbank network is thus identified by the collection of all the interbank liabilities among all
banks in the network, {yij}.
Definition 2.1. Under this setting, a network is regular if
∑
j 6=i yij =
∑
j 6=i yji = y, i.e.
everyone owes everyone the same amount.
Following Acemoglu et al. (2015), we consider a single good, finite economy with three
states, t = 0, 1, 2 and n risk-neutral banks, n < ∞, where each bank i is endowed with an
initial capital ki. Banks cannot invest using their own fund, but can borrow money each other
to finance their investments. The initial capital k can be lent to other banks, kept as cash,
or invested in competitive projects. Specifically, in state t0 the interbank lending takes place,
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and banks use the money borrowed to finance their investments. The investment can produce
two types of returns. A short-term t1 stochastic return zi, or a long-term t2 deterministic
non-pleadgeable return A, if the project is held until maturity. Also, at time t1 banks honor
their senior and interbank obligations. Due to their nature, senior obligations are nonnegative,
s > 0 external obligations that are the first ones to be paid. For the interbank obligations,
banks pay an interest rate R on the principal, so that the face vale of the j debt to bank i
is the product of the amount borrowed and the interest rates: yij = kijRij . Identifying with
yi the bank’s i interbank obligations, it follows that the bank i total liabilities at time t1 are∑
j 6=i yji + s = yi + s. In terms of liabilities liquidation, all junior (interbank) debts have equal
seniority, and are paid after the senior debts. To lighten the notation we assume si = s, for
any i = 1, . . . , n and yi =
∑
j 6=i yji = y, for any i = 1, . . . , n thus implying a uniform senior and
inter-bank liability, respectively. Once senior debts are paid, if the company defaults, junior
debts are repaid proportionally to their face values:
xji = φi yji, φi ∈ [0, 1] for any i, j = 1, . . . , n
where parameter φi is the bank fitness: if the bank i is insolvent to its junior debt then φi < 1.
Finally, if senior debts cannot be honored, junior debts are left completely unpaid. To honor
their obligations at t1, if necessary, banks can liquidate their investments at a cost ζ ∈ [0, 1].
From this repayment structure it follows that all banks’ obligations depend on the overall
resources available to banks at time t1. Formally, bank i returns to bank j the amount:
xji =

yji, if zi + ζli +
∑
k xik > s+ yi
φi yji if zi + ζli +
∑
k xik ∈ (s, s+ yi)
0 if zi + ζli +
∑
k xik ∈ (0, s)
(2)
where li ∈ [0, A] represents the bank’s liquidation decision:
li =
[
min
{
1
ζ
(s+ yi − hi), A
}]+
(3)
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where hi =
∑
j 6=i xij + zi and [·]+ = max[·, 0].
For the stochastic return from the investment at time t1, we assume it to be greater than the
senior obligations in the case of no shock, zi = a > s, while in the case of a shock, zi = a− ε.
Combining the liquidation decision, li with the debt repayment rule, we obtain:
xji =
yiji
yi
[min [hi + ζli − s, yi]]+ . (4)
It is straightforward to see that when li 6 A, i.e. the project can be only partially liquidated,
then xji = yji, thus xji < yji always together with a full liquidation li = A. For this reason we
can substitute in the previous repayment directly li = A to get:
xji =
yji
yi
[min [hi + ζA− s, yi]]+ . (5)
which does not depend on the liquidation rule and can be studied independently. Finally, we
can define the interbank social surplus as:
u =
n∑
i=1
(pii + Ti)
= n(a+A)− pε− (1− ζ)
n∑
i=1
li
where Ti 6 s is the returns to senior creditors, pii is the bank’s i profit. Denoting with p 6 n
the number of banks with shocks, the social surplus of the network changes and depends on
the magnitude of the shocks and the liquidation value. As the liquidations decrease ζ → 0,
the social surplus is solely determined by the number of defaults in the economy, i.e.:
u = n(a+A)− pε− n#defaultsA (6)
Hence, the interbank social surplus is inversely related to the number of defaults.
Equation (5) suggests that the project acts simply as an additional asset and, therefore, can
be absorbed in the variable zi. This ensures that we can study the stability properties of the
banking system in the case A = 0 without loss of generality, where the debt repaying rule is
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defined as:
xji =
yji
y
min
y, zi +∑
k 6=i
xik − s
+ . (7)
The previous rule can be interpreted as a propagation rule for financial distress, i.e. in terms
of bank’s fitness it reads as:
φi = min
(
1,
zi − s+
∑
k 6=i yik φk
y
)+
= fy,s(hi(φ)), (8)
where we have defined the activation function fy,s(h) = min(1,
h−s
y )
+ and the bank income
hi(φ) = zi +
∑
k 6=i yik φk, depending on the asset side of the balance sheet and the system’s
amount of distress. Equation (8) can be thought either as an updating rule for fitness propa-
gation, φt+1i = fy,s(hi(φ
t)), or as an equilibrium defining map F : [0, 1]n → [0, 1]n:
φ = (φ1, . . . , φn)→ F (φ) = (fy,s(hi(φ)))ni=1 , (9)
which, aside from a very specific choice of the model parameters, it generally has a unique fixed
point,8 that can be obtained numerically by simply iterating the rule from a starting point φ0
(e.g.: (1, . . . , 1)) until convergence.
Next, given the above framework, we investigate the properties of the equilibrium in terms of
1) extent of contagion:
E(φ) = 1− 1
n
n∑
i=1
δφi,1; (10)
where δφi,1 is the Kronecker delta defined as:
δφi,1 =

1 if i = j
0 if i 6= j
(11)
and 2) system’s distress:
D(φ) = 1− 1
n
n∑
i=1
φi. (12)
8More details in Acemoglu et al. (2015).
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Moreover, we also study the financial stability of the system as a function of 1) the topological
properties of the interbank directed and weighted network Y = (yij); and 2) the size and
distribution of the shocks.
It is worth noticing how under the Acemoglu et al. (2015)’s setting, the number of negative
shocks in the network, and their entity provide a way to evaluate two financial networks,
for example {yij} and {y˜ij}, in terms of stability and resilience. The former is a max-min
classification, the latter is an expectation. Given p, the financial network {yij} is more stable
than {y˜ij} if Epu > Epu˜ (which when p = 1 and for symmetric regular network implies u > u˜).
Given p, the financial network {yij} is more resilient than {y˜ij} if minu > min u˜ (which
for p = 1 and symmetric regular networks implies again that u > u˜). Note that under our
setting, shocks are deterministic. Hence, the concepts of resilience and stability as previously
defined would coincide. Interestingly, the extent of contagion proposed in Equation (10) is a
proxy for financial stability and resilience under deterministic shocks. Consequently, we depart
from Acemoglu et al. (2015) as we provide a novel and more general framework to analyze the
behaviour of the network structure.
3 Financial Networks without CoCos
In this section, we formally introduce the structure of the networks and examine how exogenous
(large and small) shocks impact on the different interbank networks. More precisely, to pro-
vide evidence on how different network connectivities may lead to different results under small
and big shocks, we simulate negative shocks of different magnitude in the interbank networks
described above. Note that at this stage, we still assume no CoCos in the network. CoCos will
be introduced in Section 4, and the types of interbank networks - without and with CoCos -
will be presented and compared. From the obtained results we also suggest some preliminary
policy implications.
For the objectives of our analysis, we consider three types of regular financial networks,
namely ring, complete and intermediate networks. Specifically, a financial network is a ring
network if yi,i−1 = y1,n = y and yij 6= 0 otherwise, where n is the total number of banks. From
13
this configuration, bank i is the unique creditor of bank i−1, and bank 1 is the unique creditor
of bank n. As a consequence of the ring structure, a default of a bank spillovers entirely on
the subsequent banks. This property makes the ring network the least interconnected type of
financial network.
A financial network is a complete network if yij =
y
n−1∀i 6= j. Under this setting, a liability
and thus a possible bank default, is equally divided among all n banks in the financial network,
thereby making the complete network the most interconnected type of financial network. The
ring network and the fully connected network are just two extreme cases of regular networks, the
first having the minimum possible connectivity (kin = kout = 1) the latter the maximal possible
connectivity (kin = kout = n− 1). Finally, since we are interested in the equilibrium properties
of the network in terms of extent of contagion as a function of the network connectivity, we
also analyze random regular networks with different values of connectivity kin = kout = c, 0 <
c <∞. For all the intermediate networks and given their degree of connectivity (c), we again
divide all the junior liabilities y of each bank in equal parts between its neighbors, i.e.:
yij =
y
c
δi∼j =⇒
∑
j
yij =
∑
j
yji = y, ∀i = 1, . . . , n. (13)
We first focus on the ring and complete networks cases, and then extend our findings to the
intermediate ones. The main finding of Acemoglu et al. (2015) about the stability of ring and
complete financial networks given a nonnegative exogenous shock ε > 0 can be summarized in
the following
Theorem 3.1. Given ε∗ = n (a− s) and y∗ = (n− 1) (a− s), then:
• as soon as ε < ε∗ (small shock regime) or y < y∗ (low exposure regime) the extent of
contagion in the ring network is larger than that in the complete network.
• as soon as ε > ε∗ and y > y∗ default becomes systemic in both the ring and the complete
networks.
As shown in Appendix A, for both cases, Theorem 3.1 can be proven analytically by solv-
ing the equilibrium Equation 8 for bank fitnesses, and then comparing the extent of financial
contagion.
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Figure 2: Simulation on ring and complete network with N = 50, a = 21, s = 20, y = 75 > y?.
Left panel: extent of contagion; Right panel: system’s distress.
Focusing on the extent of financial contagion and on banking distress, the left and right pan-
els of Figure 2 indicate the values of E(φ) and D(φ) as a function of the shock in the high
exposure regime (y > y?), respectively. Both figures depict with a blue (green) continuous
line the ring (complete) network and, dotted in black, where the contagion becomes systemic,
ε = ε∗. Results are obtained by simulating the equilibrium in a network of N = 50 banks, with
a return from the investment equal to a = 21, senior obligations s = 20 and in high exposure
regime y = 75 > y?. To simplify the simulation we set R = 0, thus assuming the debt to
be already inclusive of any interest and, as in Acemoglu et al. (2015), we set the liquidation
cost equal to ζ = 0. Notably, although our focus is not directly on resilience and stability
as in Acemoglu et al. (2015) we also find, for both our variables of interest, a clear phase
transition between the ring and the complete networks. Therefore, these results are suggestive
of at least two important policy implications. A first ex-ante recommendation, and consistent
with the evidence presented in Acemoglu et al. (2015), is for regulators to enhance the regu-
latory oversight and the effective monitoring of the interbank interconnections (connectivity).
This activity in turn would require the design and implementation of data-based measures of
interconnectedness catching the degree of exposures between financial institutions. A second,
ex-post recommendation, is to contain, in presence of large negative shocks, the propagation of
contagion by providing financial support or even bail out the SIFIs and the too interconnected
to fail financial institutions. Yet, regulators should carefully weight in the associated opportu-
nity costs of moral hazard and incentives for excessive risk taking by banking intermediaries.
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Therefore, our results strongly corroborate the view that government interventions might be
beneficial (welfare improving) for the stability and efficiency of the financial network’s struc-
ture (especially for a highly interconnected, such as the complete network).
The reason for the existence of a phase transition is the presence of two types of shock ab-
sorbers in the network. The first absorber is the excess liquidity a−s > 0 of the non-distressed
banks. Note that the impact of a shock is less severe for banks with excess liquidity. The sec-
ond absorber is represented by the claim s of senior creditors of the distressed bank. The first
shock absorber perform efficiently in the complete network, while the latter is least effective
in the complete network. Thus, contagion (default leading to default) is quicker with the ring
network for small shocks hence, the ring network is less resilient and stable than the complete
network. On the other hand, large shocks, which by definition envisage less interconnection
among banks, lead to senior debts being wiped out to absorb losses. Hence, the ring network
becomes as stable as the complete network thus reflecting a robust-yet-fragile framework.
Finally, we repeat the same analysis but for different intermediate network connectivity, c
= 2, 3, 10, 20, 30, 40. Note that it is possible to generate randomly a regular network using the
directed configuration model Bolloba´s (1980); Newman (2010), i.e. by considering for each node
a number kin (resp. kout) of half in-links (resp. half out-links), and then randomly connecting
each half out-link with a half in-link. A practical complication of the configuration model is
that sampled networks may have self-loops and multi-edges (especially for large connectivity).
These can be removed manually but, as a result, the network is not exactly regular. To limit
the impact of this heterogeneity, we define the vector z of bank investments in absence of
shocks as:
zi = a+ (y
in − youti ), i = 1, . . . , n, (14)
where yin =
∑
j yji = y is the bank i liability, while y
out
i =
∑
j yij is the total system liability
to bank i, that could be different from y. The previously defined zi compensates the imbalance
such that each bank, in absence of shocks, has a net incoming flow a, as should be in a pure
regular network.
The results depicted in Figure 3 are obtained by averaging over different network real-
izations simulated with the same degree of connectivity c. Once more, the ring and complete
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Figure 3: Simulation on Random Regular networks with N = 50, a = 21, s = 20, y = 75 > y?.
Results are averaged over 10 different realizations sampled from a directed configuration model.
Left panel: extent of contagion; Right panel: system’s distress.
networks are depicted in blue and green with a continuous line, while the intermediate networks
are represented with different colors. Interestingly, we can clearly see that with an extent of
financial contagion almost equal to zero, results confirm the higher stability of the complete
network to small shocks, with respect to all other networks. In fact, while for the ring and all
intermediate networks the extent of contagion is increasing with the shock size, the complete
network experiences a systemic contagion only for ε > ε?, and with a jump that determines the
previously defined phase transition. Focusing on the intermediate networks, it is possible to
dig deeper into the behavior of networks and their responses to shocks. Notably, our evidence
indicates the existence of three and not only two regimes. More precisely, starting from the
ring network and increasing the degree of connectivity, the system becomes more and more re-
silient, with a jump in the extent of contagion for increasing values of the shock size. The jump
corresponds to the point in which the shock propagates simultaneously to all the neighbors of
the stressed bank. In the limit, the network becomes fully connected, and the system is stable
up to the transition point where the shock becomes systemic. It is interesting to note that
there are regimes in the shock size where higher connectivity does not translate into higher
stability. This implies that a more connected network is typically more stable only before the
occurrence of the first jump. Afterwards, the system becomes more fragile as opposed to the
case of lower connectivity.
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4 Financial Network with CoCos
In this section, we repeat the same experiment of the previous section, except this time we
adjust the model by introducing CoCos within the banks balance sheet structure to examine
their impact on the interbank network. To provide direct evidence on the effects of the conver-
sions, we propose the analysis for equity-conversion CoCos. To add CoCos in the bank balance
sheet structure, we first finalize the bank i’s initial balance sheet including the equity Ei, as
illustrated in Figure 4. Thus, the bank i’s balance sheet identity is modified accordingly:
Figure 4: Bank i’s balance sheet as defined in Equation (15).
∑
j 6=i
xij + zi =
∑
j 6=i
xji + s+ Ei. (15)
As a consequence of adding equity in the analysis, the social surplus in the network is now
defined as:
u =
n∑
i=1
(Ei + Ti) . (16)
As a second step, let Vi =
∑
j 6=i xij + zi. Then, under this set-up, if xji were vanilla bonds
with face value yji, the payoffs to each creditor are:
si = min [s, Vi]
xi = [min [Vi − s, yi]]+ (17)
Ei = [Vi − s− yi]+
18
where yi =
∑
j 6=i yji. It is worth noticing that the payoff xi is equivalent to the Acemoglu
et al. (2015) payoff for the debt repayment. Third, let all xij be CoCos with vanilla bonds
represented by s.
A crucial and not trivial element in the CoCos configuration is the trigger. In his broad
literature review, Flannery (2014) shows that a suitable and always valid trigger for a CoCo
is:
PtQt
Bt
6 N−1(α|σAt) (18)
where PtQt is the firm’s share price and the relative quantity, Bt the most recent book value
of the assets, α the desired solvency level and σAt the volatility of the assets portfolio. While
the left hand side is a common indicator for most CoCos with a book-value trigger, the right
hand side is fully discretionary. In our case, we generalize Equation 18 and consider a CoCos
to be triggered whenever:
Ei
Vi
6 τ ⇔ Vi 6 s+ yi
1− τ
where τ is the trigger capital ratio.
Having introduced CoCos in the bank i’s balance sheet, we next examine their role within a
network of banks in two steps. In Section 4.1, we first consider a network of banks with CoCos
and study how and when shocks lead to a systemic CoCos triggering. Then, in Section 4.2,
we explore the real effects of CoCos as a regulatory tool on the banks’ balance sheets by
modelling the dynamics of the actual amount of money (i.e. bonds) converted into equity in
case of trigger.
4.1 CoCos Conversion
For CoCos with equity-conversion, in the case of trigger, bonds are partially or wholly converted
into equity to make up (if possible) the shortfall up to Ei = τVi. Suppose that before conversion
Ei = E¯Vi, with E¯ 6 τ . The amount of bond ∆y to be converted into equity is thus ∆y =
(τ − E¯)Vi. If yi < ∆y the entire CoCo is converted. Note that:
yi < ∆y ⇐⇒ Vi − s− E¯Vi < (τ − E¯)Vi =⇒ Vi < s
1− τ . (19)
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We can therefore distinguish between the following cases. First, if s1−τ 6 Vi 6
s+yi
1−τ , the bond is
partially converted into equity, hence this implies that the CoCos holders hold ∆y = (τ − E¯)Vi
of converted equity and xi = yi − ∆y = (1 − τ)Vi − s of unconverted CoCos. Second, if
s 6 Vi 6 s1−τ , the entire CoCo is converted. Hence, the CoCo holders hold ∆y = yi of
converted equity and no unconverted CoCo. Third, if Vi 6 s, the equity holders bear the losses
before senior creditors. Combining all these cases together we obtain:
xi = min[yi, (1− τ)Vi − s]+. (20)
Equivalently, the trigger propagation rule in terms of the banks fitness φi = xi/yi is:
φi = fy,s((1− τ)hi(φ)), (21)
with the same propagation function of the case with no CoCos. The main difference between
Equation 20 and Equation 21 is in the interpretation of the fitness parameter φi. In presence of
CoCos, φi < 1, does not suggest a default, but just the triggering of the CoCo. Consequently,
the distress propagation in this system indicates a triggering propagation. It is worth stressing
that there is a unique equilibrium which can be derived analytically and whose property is
summarized in the following theorem:
Theorem 4.1. There exist exposure thresholds y∗r (τ), y∗c (τ) given by Equations (38), (44) and
shock thresholds ε∗r(y, τ), ε∗c(y, τ) given by Equations (39), (45) such that:
• when (y, τ) ∈ Sr = {ε > ε∗r(y, τ), y > y∗r (τ)} the shock triggers a systemic CoCo triggering
in the ring network.
• when (y, τ) ∈ Sc = {ε > ε∗c(y, τ), y > y∗c (τ)} the shock triggers a systemic CoCo triggering
in the complete connected network.
Sr and Sc identify the systemic unstable regions for the ring and complete networks, respec-
tively. It follows that their complement Scr and Scc identify the safe regions for the ring and
complete networks, respectively. Moreover Sr ⊂ Sc and
• when (y, τ) 6∈ Sc(implying (y, τ) 6∈ Sr) the ring network is the least (and the complete
network is the most stable) financial network.
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Figure 5: Safe region for the ring and the complete networks for different values of τ .
• there exist a region where (y, τ) 6∈ Sr but (y, τ) ∈ Sc where the ring network is the most
(and the complete network is the least) stable financial network.
The proof is reported in Appendix B.2 and is based again on the analytical solution of the
fixed point Equation (21). The first part of the theorem states that, in presence of CoCos,
the unstable region (large shock and high exposure) is not universal, as in the case of vanilla
bond, but strongly depends on the network structure. As a consequence of the dependence on
the network structure, there are different thresholds for different levels of shock size (ε) and
exposure (y). Moreover, as shown in Figure 5, the unstable regions (or equivalently the safe
regions) are strongly affected by the triggering parameter τ . When τ tends to zero, CoCos
become vanilla bonds, and the two regions tend to coincide. When instead τ increases, the two
regions tend to diverge more and more significantly. In the second part of the theorem, the two
unstable regions (for the ring and complete networks) are compared. Remarkably, it appears
that the safe region for the complete network is the smallest one. This suggests that if the size
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of the shock is such that it does not determine a systemic triggering in the complete network,
the latter is the most stable topology (first point). However (second point), the triggering in
the complete network becomes systemic for a shock size that is smaller than the one necessary
for a systemic triggering in the ring network. As such, as illustrated in Figure 5 with the orange
region, there exists a medium shock size region, in which the ring network is more stable than
the complete one. For larger shocks, the triggering becomes systemic also in the ring network,
and the two topologies are equivalently sub-optimal.
Figure 6 shows the extent of contagion and system’s distress as a function of the shock size in
a high exposure regime, for different network connectivity. For consistency with the previous
analysis, we repeat the simulation exercise on random regular networks with N = 50, a = 21,
s = 20, y = 75, and all results are averaged over 10 different realizations sampled from a
directed configuration model. Again, the degrees of connectivity are equal to c =2, 3, 10,
20, 30, 40 and maintained constant throughout the simulations. As we can observe from the
Figure 6: Simulation on random regular networks with N = 50, a = 21, s = 20, y = 75. Results
are averaged over 10 different realizations sampled from a directed configuration model.
figure the system behaves as in the vanilla bond case for a shock of relatively small size. The
ring network is the most resilient, the complete network the least robust and for intermediate
connectivity jumps occur again, delimiting the region where the higher connectivity enables
the system’s robustness. Note that immediately after a jump occurs, the network enters a
fragility phase where systems with lower connectivity are more robust. For medium shocks
sizes, there is an inversion point, where all the lines in Figure 6 cross, after which the contagion
becomes systemic in the complete network, whereas the ring network is still relatively stable.
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Finally, for larger shocks sizes, all the network structures are equivalent, since they cannot
prevent the triggering to become systemic. A final remark on the difference between CoCos
and vanilla bonds concerns the shape of the shock size threshold ε(y, τ) which now explicitly
depends on the bank exposure y (instead of τ). In particular, for both network topologies
the critical threshold decreases with the exposure (the higher the exposure the smaller the
safe regions) while in the presence of vanilla bond (τ = 0) it is independent. An important
financial stability consequence is the existence of a maximal exposure, beyond which any (even
small) shock can determine the triggering of the distressed bank and can potentially lead to a
systemic crisis.
4.2 CoCos with equity liquidation
As a final step, we proceed to analyze the scenario of a trigger event in which the CoCos holder
bank uses the equity received from the CoCo issuer bank. Note that neglecting this monetary
value would result in an overestimation of both the shock size and the degree of systemic
distress or, equivalently, to underestimate the systemic crisis threshold. More specifically, in
this section we document the possibility for the CoCos holder to liquidate, at a liquidation
cost, the dollar amount of shares of the CoCos issuer bank received as a consequence of the
trigger. Formally, if a shock in the economy leads to a trigger, the CoCo issuer bank i repays
an amount xnci of unconverted CoCo:
xnci = min[yi, (1− τ)Vi − s]+. (22)
while it converts and uses the remaining amount xci :
xci = yi − xi. (23)
If we denote with η ∈ [0, 1] the effective market value of the issuer bank’s share after the
trigger, we can generalize the debt repaying rule as:
xi = x
nc
i + ηx
c = ηyi + (1− η) min[yi, (1− τ)Vi − s]+ (24)
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and, equivalently, the propagation rule in terms of the bank fitness as:
φi = η + (1− η)fy,s((1− τ)hi(φ)). (25)
The value of η is bounded between 0 and 1, and denotes the dollar value of the converted
shares. Indeed, such a value depends by many internal and external factors, like the overall
quality of the bank, of the banking system and the size of the shock that affects an individual
bank. Moreover, a CoCo conversion might depress the bank’s equity, being a trigger usually
seen as a bad signal for the bank issuer by market participants. In this paper, we treat η as
exogenously given, and analyze the effects on the level of bank fitness for different values of η.
First, for η = 0 (shares have zero value) the bank cannot use any money from the conver-
sion and we indeed retrieve the results of the previous section. Second, for 0 < η 6 1 the
equity conversion mitigates the propagation of the shock in a non-linear way, and η becomes
the minimum possible bank fitness. Figure 7 shows the extent of contagion as a function of
the shock obtained by simulating the equilibrium in a network of N = 50, a = 21, s = 20,
y = 75. Given this equilibrium and a fixed value τ = 0.008, the left and right panels of
Figure 7 show the results of the simulation for the ring (blue line), complete (green line) and
intermediate networks (remaining lines) with a conversion coefficient equal to η = 0.03 (left)
and η = 0.3 (right), respectively. For η = 0.03 (left panel) the ring network is more stable
Figure 7: Simulation on Random Regular networks with N = 50, a = 21, s = 20, y = 75.
Results are averaged over 10 different realizations sampled from a directed configuration model.
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than both the complete network and all the intermediate ones. In fact, while the extent of
contagion is systemic (=1) in the ring network for big shocks only (from ε > 35 on), the
complete network is the first type of network that achieves maximal instability (for ε > 12),
followed by the intermediate networks. With respect to the intermediate networks, the lightly
interconnected ones are again more stable than the highly interconnected networks, and with
a stronger magnitude than the case with no equity conversion. Unsurprisingly, the stability of
the ring and lightly interconnected networks is even stronger as η increases, but in a non-linear
way. As we can see from the right panel of Figure 7, for η = 0.3, the ring network is not
only again the most stable network, but a) it never achieves the full extent of contagion and
b) reaches the maximal extent of contagion at around E(φ)=20% also for the largest shocks.
Moreover, although the extent of contagion increases with the degree of interconnections, the
change is non-linear. Therefore, the lightly interconnected networks (c = 2 and c = 3) are
never susceptible to systemic contagion and reach their maximum value at E(φ) ≈ 60%. Fi-
nally, for the set of medium to highly interconnected networks, the extent of contagion grows
more than linearly, with the complete network showing a systemic contagion already for small
shocks (ε = 17). Hence, our results clearly demonstrate that the equity conversion is the
most beneficial for no or lowly interconnected networks and the most detrimental for highly
interconnected networks. In fact, highly interconnected networks are more prone to financial
contagion in presence of a CoCos trigger. Note that the estimated results depend on the choice
of η, to circumvent discretionary choices and to provide a general overview of the role of η for
the complete and ring networks. Figure 8 summarizes the results. Plotting the level of the
critical size of the shock ε∗(η, τ) ∈ [0, 100] on the y axis, and the conversion value η ∈ [0, 1]
on the x axis, the figure clearly illustrates how in the ring network the critical size of the
shock grows much faster than in the complete network. More precisely, while the complete
network critical shock size has a very slow growth, for η ≈ 0.1 the ring one has already ex-
ploded, meaning that for those values the ring network can never experience a systemic trigger.
As discussed so far, the complete and highly interconnected networks are more prone to
CoCos conversion in presence of shocks. As illustrated in Figure 8, in fact the equity conversion
resulting from the trigger might be beneficial for the banking system when the shock amplifies
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Figure 8: Critical shock for the ring and the complete network as a function of η, see Appendix
C for explicit expressions.
systemic financial risk. By contrast, unnecessary conversions might actually penalize (and hit)
the bond (CoCo) holders. We define the conversions to be unnecessary whenever a shock leads
to a systemic conversion without creating systemic risk in the economy. To better elucidate
this result, we now compare Figure 2 with Figure 8. Figure 2 shows that in absence of CoCos
the risk is systemic only from ε > 50, while Figure 8 illustrates that the ring and many lightly
interconnected networks experience a systemic trigger for much smaller shocks in the economy.
From a market perspective, to avoid the automatic triggering below a certain threshold, CoCos
issuers could consider to issue CoCos with a dual trigger conversion (e.g.: McDonald (2013)),
one endogenous trigger, linked to the balance-sheet or firm’s equity value, and one endogenous,
controlled by the regulatory authority.
Our results have important implications for financial stability, policy analysis and wel-
fare. A first notable implication is for policymakers and regulators to be vigilant and pursue
a targeted nuanced monitoring approach on the issuance of the contracts and the way the
instruments are actually managed by financial institutions, primarily by the systemically im-
portant financial institutions (SIFIs). We advocate that regulators should consider an adequate
monitoring of the degree of exposure to these instruments of the SIFIs in order to mitigate pos-
sible systemic risk concerns especially in the case of highly interconnected networks of banks
and/versus other financial institutions. A first specific policy recommendation is for the rele-
vant supervisory authorities to enhance the disclosure requirements of the typology, features
and amount of CoCo held by each individual bank as well as their types of interdependencies
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(counterparty risk) with other banking intermediaries and non-banking financial institutions
(shadow banking). A second policy recommendation is for regulators to carefully reconsider
the design and the structuring of CoCos potentially incentivizing the issuance of going-concern
CoCos with market-based triggers which may reduce inherent agency costs problems between
banks’ managers and shareholders. Nonetheless, we take an agnostic view as for the welfare
effects of these instruments.
5 Conclusions
Contingent convertible bonds (CoCos) are regulatory financial instruments introduced in the
aftermath of the 2008-2009 financial crisis with the aim of containing the build-up of systemic
risk in the financial system in bad times. In this paper we propose different balance-sheet
based interbank financial networks, with and without CoCos, and we show that the structure
of the network is of great importance for the effectiveness of CoCos as risk mitigating securities.
Specifically, we demonstrate that for ring and complete networks the state (phase) transition
in a network without CoCos is also naturally operational in a network with CoCos, thus
confirming the robust-yet-fragile result documented by Acemoglu et al. (2015). We also show
that, in presence of moderate shocks, lowly interconnected networks enhance the stability of the
financial system more than highly interconnected ones. Finally, we show that to maximize the
effectiveness of CoCos both issuers and investors should consider the type of interbank financial
network where they live. Overall, policymakers and regulators should carefully consider the
role of the interbank network to assess the potential financial contagion dynamics of CoCos.
27
A Proof of Theorem 3.1
A.1 Ring Network
In this case yij = y(δj,i+1 + δj,i−1). We can study analytically the equilibrium of the system
after an idiosyncratic shock of size ε on one bank: z = (a− ε, a, . . . , a), a > s and ε > (a− s).
Denoting φ? the equilibrium we have that φ?1 6 φ?2 6 . . . 6 φ?n. Let
n¯(φ?) = max{i : φ?i < 1} (26)
the number of insolvent banks. As soon as n¯ < n, it should be φn = 1 and thus:
φ1 = fy,s(y + a− ε)
φi = φi−1 +
a− s
y
= φ1 + (i− 1)a− s
y
, i = 2, . . . , n¯
φi = 1, i > n¯.
It holds as soon as n¯ < n, i.e. fy,s(y + a− ε) + (n− 1)a−sy > 1, whose solution is
ε < ε? = n(a− s) or y < y? = (n− 1)(a− s), (27)
exactly as in Acemoglu et al. (2015). This is the equilibrium in the small shock (ε < ε?) or
low exposure (y < y?) regime, where ε? is the total system’ liquidity in absence of shocks. In
this regime the extension of the contagion is, from Equation 27,
E(φ?) = n¯(φ?)/n = b1 + y
a− s (1− fy,s(y + a− ε))c/n, (28)
which is linearly stepwise increasing with ε until min(ε?, y + (a − s)). Analogously the total
distress is
D(φ) =
‖1− φ?‖
n
≈ n¯(φ)(1− φ
?
1)
2n
(29)
which grows quadratically in ε up to the transition. On the contrary, when ε > ε? and
y > y?, it is n¯ = n. In this regime it should be at the same time φn = φ1 + (n − 1)a−sy and
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φ1 = (φn +
a−s−ε
y )
+. The only possibility is that:
φ1 = 0
φi = (i− 1)a− s
y
, i > 1.
This solution is independent from ε since the distress propagation is already maximal: E(φ?) =
1 and D(φ?) = 1− (a−s)(n−1)2y = 1− 12 y
?
y .
A.2 Fully connected network
In this case, every pair of banks is connected and the junior liability of a bank is equally
distributed among its neighbors, i.e. yij =
y
n−1 , ∀i 6= j. Again, we can study analytically the
equilibrium of the system after an idiosyncratic shock of size ε on one bank: z = (a−ε, a, . . . , a),
a > s and ε > (a − s). In fact, in this case all the updating rules Eq. (8) for non shocked
banks have the same structure. Thus, we can make an ansatz for the equilibrium and search
for a solution of the form:
φi =

φs if i = 1, ( shocked bank)
φns if i > 1, ( non shocked bank),
(30)
where (φs, φns) satisfying:
φs = fys(a− ε+ yφns)
φns = fys(a+
y
n− 1φs + y
n− 2
n− 1φns). (31)
Equation (31) do not admit solutions if both φs, φns ∈ (0, 1). The two possibilities are
φns = 1 =⇒ φs =
(
1− ε− (a− s)
y
)+
φs = 0 =⇒ φns = (n− 1)(a− s)
y
=
y?
y
. (32)
The latter is admissible as soon as y > y? and φs = 0, implying ε > n(a − s) = ε?, thus
corresponding to the large shock large exposure regime. On the contrary, y < y? or ε < ε?, the
29
first solution holds, corresponding to an equilibrium where the shocked bank is insolvent while
the rest of the system has absorbed the distress. In this second case, the solution is independent
from ε for ε > y + (a− s), corresponding to the maximum distress that bank 1 can propagate
given its (limited) debt. The extension of contagion and overall financial distress can be easily
computed starting from the analytical solutions 32. In particular, their maximum values in
the large shock regime are E(φ?) = 1 and D(φ?) = 1− (1+(n−1)y?/yn ) ≈ 1− y?/y < Dring.
B Proof of Theorem 4.1
First, we need the following propositions:
Proposition B.1. In a ring network with z = (a− ε, a, . . . , a) it holds ∀i = 1, . . . , n− 1
φ?i = 1 =⇒ φ?i+1 = 1.
Proof. For any i = 1, . . . , n − 1, φ?i = 1 means that ((1 − τ)a − s)/y + (1 − τ)φ?i−1 − δi1(1 −
τ)ε/y > 1, i.e. ((1− τ)a− s)/y > 1− (1− τ)φ?i−1 > 1− (1− τ). ]= Thus:
(1− τ)φ?i +
(1− τ)a− s
y
= (1− τ) + (1− τ)a− s
y
> 1,
implying φ?i+1 = 1. At τ = 0 the proposition is true simply because the sequence φ
?
i is weakly
increasing.
Proposition B.2. For any b ∈ R, ε > 0 and λ ∈ [0, 1], given φ(y, ε) = (1− τ)(1− ε/y) + b/y,
then the portion of the positive (y, ε) plane defined by the stability condition:
(1− λ) min(φ(y, ε), 1)+ + b λ
τy
> 1
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is the intersection of the regions defined by y 6 y?λ, ε 6 ε?λ(y) and ε 6 ε?(y) with:
y?λ =
bλ
τ
ε?λ(y) = b
(
λ
τ
+
1
1− τ
)
− (y − y?λ)
(
1
(1− τ)(1− λ) − 1
)
ε?(y) =
b− τy
1− τ .
The low exposure regime is identified by y?λ, the small shock regime by ε
?
λ(y) and the no-shock
regime by ε?(y), which is correctly independent from λ, encoding the network structure.
Proof. (1) If φ(y, ε) > 1, i.e. ε?(y), then the condition is fulfilled, because ε > 0 implies
b > τy and the l.h.s. is a convex combination of two numbers larger than 1. (2) If bλ/τy > 1,
i.e. y 6 y?λ the condition is fulfilled simply because (1 − λ)φ(y, ε) is always positive. This is
also a necessary and sufficient condition when φ(y, ε) 6 0 (3) If φ(y, ε) ∈ [0, 1] then we have
straightforwardly the condition ε 6 ε?λ(y), since
(1− λ)φ(y, ε) + b λ
τy
> 1 =⇒ (1− λ)
(
(1− τ)(1− ε
y
) +
b
y
)
+ b
λ
τy
> 1
=⇒ (1− λ) ((1− τ)(y − ε) + b) + bλ
τ
> y
=⇒ y(1− (1− λ)(1− τ)) + ε(1− λ)(1− τ) 6 b
(
(1− λ) + λ
τ
)
=⇒ (y − y?λ)(1− (1− λ)(1− τ)) + ε(1− λ)(1− τ) 6 b
(
(1− λ) + λ
τ
(1− λ)(1− τ)
)
This must be a stronger condition if instead φ(y, ε) > 1 and is also a stronger condition when
φ(y, ε) 6 0, since in this case
(1− λ) min(φ(y, ε), 1)+ + b λ
τy
> (1− λ)φ(y, ε) + b λ
τy
> 1.
For this reason, the desired region is just the intersection of (1), (2) and (3), together with the
conditions of positive ε and y.
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B.1 Ring Network
We follow the same analysis of the previous section (i.e. in absence of CoCo). Again, yij =
y(δj,i+1 + δj,i−1) and z = (a− ε, a, . . . , a). We assume no triggers in absence of shocks, i.e.:
Ei
Vi
=
a− s
a+ y
> τ =⇒ (1− τ)a− s > τy > 0. (33)
Moreover, we consider the situation where the size of the shock is at least responsible of the
first bank triggering, i.e.
a− ε− s
a+ y
> τ =⇒ ε > ε?(y, τ) = (a+ y)− s+ y
1− τ , (34)
where ε?(y, τ coincides with the no-shock threshold of Proposition B.2. Since φ?i = 1 =⇒
φ?i+1 = 1, see Proposition B.1, we can define as in the previous case:
n¯(φ?) = max{i : φ?i < 1} (35)
as the number of non-triggered banks. As soon as n¯ < n, it should be φn = 1 and thus:
φ1 = fy,s((1− τ)(y + a− ε))
φi = (1− τ)φi−1 + (1− τ)a− s
y
= (1− τ)i−1φ1 + (1− τ)a− s
y
i−2∑
k=0
(1− τ)k i = 2, . . . , n¯
φi = 1, i > n¯. (36)
Defining λrτ = 1− (1− τ)n−1, this solution holds as soon as:
φn = (1− λrτ )φ1 + λrτ
(1− τ)a− s
τy
> 1. (37)
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The previous condition is satisfied if y 6 y?r (τ) or ε 6 ε?r(y, τ), where (Proposition B.2, with
b = (1− τ)a− s and λ = λrτ ),
y?r (τ) =
λrτ
τ
[(1− τ)a− s] (38)
ε?r(y, τ) =
(
λrτ
τ
+
1
1− τ
)
[(1− τ)a− s]− (y − y?r )
(
1
(1− τ)(1− λrτ )
− 1
)
(39)
In the limit τ → 0, since λrττ → (n− 1), we retrieve the results of the previous section y?r (τ)→
y? = (n− 1)(a− s) and ε?r(y, τ)→ ε? = n(a− s), Figure 5. We can compute the extension of
the triggering contagion as φn¯ = 1, bringing to:
E(φ?) = n¯(φ?)/n =
log ((φ∞ − 1)/(φ∞ − φ1))
n log(1− τ) , (40)
where φ∞ =
(1−τ)a−s
τy and φ1 as in 36.
B.2 Complete network
In this case, we can again make the ansatz
φ?i =

φ?s if i = 1, ( shocked bank)
φ?ns if i > 1, ( non shocked bank),
(41)
where (φ?s, φ
?
ns) the solution of
φs = fys((1− τ)(a− ε+ yφns))
φns = fys((1− τ)(a+ y
n− 1φs + y
n− 2
n− 1φns).
33
In the safe case, where the trigger doesn’t propagate through the entire network, the solution
must be
φ?s = fys((1− τ)(a− ε+ y)) φ?ns = min(1, φns)+ = 1
φns =
(1− τ)a− s
y
+
1− τ
n− 1φs +
(1− τ)(n− 2)
n− 1 φns
= (1− λcτ )φs +
λcτ
τ
[(1− τ)a− s] , (42)
where we have defined
λcτ =
τ(n− 1)
1 + τ(n− 2) . (43)
This solution exists if φns > 1, i.e. again using Proposition B.2 with b = (1 − τ)a − s and
λ = λcτ , if and only if y 6 y?c (τ) or ε 6 ε?c(y, τ), where
y?c (τ) =
λcτ
τ
[(1− τ)a− s] (44)
ε?c(y, τ) =
(
λcτ
τ
+
1
1− τ
)
[(1− τ)a− s]− (y − y?c )
(
1
(1− τ)(1− λfτ )
− 1
)
. (45)
We have
lim
τ→0
y?c (τ) = lim
τ→0
y?r (τ) = y
? = (n− 1)(a− s) (46)
and
lim
τ→0
ε?c(y, τ) = lim
τ→0
ε?r(y, τ) = ε
? = n(a− s). (47)
C Cocos with equity liquidation
C.1 Ring Network
Computations similar to those in the previous section bring to
ε?r(τ, η) = [(1− τ)(a+ y)− (s+ y)]
(
(1− η)(1− C(η, τ)n)
Cn(η, τ)(1− C(η, τ))
)
(48)
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with C(η, τ) = (1− η)(1− τ). In fact as soon as φn = 1 we have ∀i 6 n¯
φi = η + (1− η)fy,s((1− τ)h(φi−1)) = A+ Cφi−1
= Ci−1φ1 +A
i−2∑
k=0
Ck = Ci−1φ1 +A
1− Ci−1
1− C
with A = η + (1− η)b/y and C = C(η, τ) = (1− η)(1− τ). The critical threshold in the ring
network is the solution of the equation φn(ε) = 1, i.e.
Cn−1φ1(ε) +A
1− Cn−1
1− C = 1 (49)
where φ1(ε) = A+ C(1− ε/y). Straightforward manipulations bring equation (48)
C.2 Complete Network
In the case of the complete network we have that
ε?c(τ, η) = [(1− τ)(a+ y)− (s+ y)]
(
n− τ − η(1− τ)
(1− η)(1− τ)2
)
. (50)
In fact in this case the critical shock is the solution of the equation φns(ε) = 1, i.e.
φns(ε) = η + (1− η)fys((1− τ)(a+ y
n− 1φs(ε) + y
n− 2
n− 1)) = 1, (51)
where
φs(ε) = η + (1− η)(1− τ)(a− ε+ y)− s
y
. (52)
Solving in ε equation (50) follows straightforwardly.
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